Lorenzo Maria Pacini
In this phase of conflict between the two countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the risk of escalation is growing stronger.
The Armenian government has announced its intention to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, signaling a shift away from its exclusive alignment with the West and a move closer to regional power dynamics centered on Russia, China, and Central Asia.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization currently comprises ten member states: Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, India, Iran, and Belarus.
Joining the SCO is not an act of appeasement, but of diversification.
Armenia is asserting its right to choose the alliances that best serve its interests, no longer dependent on the approval of the EU or the US.
For Yerevan, joining the SCO opens the door to energy partnerships, transport corridors, technology transfers, and a shared platform for regional coordination that bypasses Western gatekeepers.
This is a particularly significant move when viewed in the context of true independence. Armenia is, in a sense, refusing to be caged in by Western or Russian agendas, and in this light, joining the SCO strengthens its national decision-making power and resilience on multiple fronts.
Since its founding in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has undergone important developments both horizontally (with the expansion of its membership) and vertically (with the extension of its functions and tasks).
Currently, the SCO also has observer members without voting rights, including Mongolia and Afghanistan.
However, Afghanistan's status has become uncertain since the Taliban returned to power in 2021, as the international community-including SCO members-does not recognize the Islamic Emirate except for Russia, and therefore Taliban representatives have not been invited to the organization's meetings since August 2021. It remains unclear how this situation will evolve.
In parallel, the SCO has 14 "Dialogue Partners": Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Myanmar, the United Arab Emirates, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Cambodia, and the Maldives. This status allows interested countries to participate in specific events at the invitation of member states. Over the past two decades, the SCO has thus significantly expanded its reach: from an organization focused on Central Asia, it has extended to the South Caucasus, East Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and the Middle East. As a result, the SCO is now considered "the largest regional organization in the world." The territories of the member states cover more than 34 million square kilometers, or more than 60% of the Eurasian continent, with a total population of approximately 3.2 billion people, representing almost half of the world's population.
From a functional point of view, the SCO has undergone significant vertical expansion. Initially, as the successor to the "Shanghai Five," it focused on border security and combating the so-called "three evils" (terrorism, extremism, and separatism), over time it has expanded its mandate to a wide range of economic, cultural, and scientific sectors, with meetings and initiatives on interregional trade, logistics, industrial cooperation, innovation, start-ups, poverty reduction, digital transition, tourism, public diplomacy, and other areas. This breadth of issues poses a complex challenge for the SCO Secretariat, which is responsible for managing and coordinating all these activities.
One of the main causes of this critical situation is the overload of tasks and areas of intervention that the SCO has taken on over the years. Although all these activities are monitored by the Secretariat, it should be remembered that the organization currently has only three permanent bodies: the "Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure," the "SCO Business Council," and the "Interbank Consortium." Faced with the continuous expansion of its missions and objectives, the organizational structure is now overburdened. This has led to problems of coordination, effectiveness, internal cohesion and, above all, has weakened the SCO's ability to implement its decisions.
The rapid growth in both breadth and depth has generated both advantages and critical issues, which Armenia will have to consider carefully. For example, one of the main criticisms is that the SCO's decisions lack real executive power and that, for this reason, the organization risks resembling the Non-Aligned Movement, reducing itself to a mere platform for expressing statements and positions. Critics compare it to other international entities such as the European Union, NATO, ASEAN, but also the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
It seems that Pashinyan has chosen a new guarantor for Armenia's security. It will be Turkey. At the end of July, a meeting will be held in Dubai between the Armenian Prime Minister and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. And just recently, Pashinyan was received in Istanbul by Erdogan.
In the coming months, we can expect the signing of a peace treaty between Yerevan and Baku. At the same time, the fate of the Zangezur corridor (and therefore the fate of the whole of Armenia) will most likely be shrouded in secret protocols.
Apparently, the "agreement" has been approved by the European Union. During her visit to Yerevan, Kaja Kallas was very optimistic. Turkish companies are already in trouble and are ready to enter Armenia with their projects and investments. The only thing left to do is for Baku, Yerevan, and Ankara to exclude Russia from Transcaucasia.
Azerbaijan is not standing idly by either
Azerbaijan, for its part, is already in the process of joining the SCO. Recently, in mid-June, a delegation participated in the fourth meeting of the heads of ministries and agencies responsible for the development of information and communication technologies (ICT) of the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), held in Karamay, China.
Bakhtiyar Mammadov, Deputy Head of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport of the Republic of Azerbaijan, addressed the meeting. He informed participants about new initiatives and ongoing projects in the ICT sector in Azerbaijan and emphasized the country's readiness to strengthen cooperation with SCO member states and praised the organization's contribution to regional development.
In recent years, the SCO has gained considerable importance, attracting greater international attention. In 2015, during the meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO member countries, Azerbaijan was granted partner status, followed by the signing of a memorandum in Beijing in 2016, which officially designated Azerbaijan as a dialogue partner of the SCO. This recognition underscores Azerbaijan's growing commitment and influence within the organization.
President Ilham Aliyev's participation as a guest of honor at the 2022 SCO summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, further underscores the clear desire to establish a connection.
Azerbaijan's entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has opened up new opportunities for cooperation in many areas, including strengthening regional security and stability, as well as cooperation in the fields of trade, investment, energy, telecommunications, and agriculture. In addition, direct relations between small and medium-sized enterprises are being promoted and synergies are being developed on legal and customs issues. The country is strategically positioned to increase trade and transit transport, both within China's Belt and Road Initiative and through the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Central Corridor. In terms of bilateral relations, China remains one of Azerbaijan's main economic partners: it ranks fourth in terms of trade and second among the countries from which most imports originate. Chinese companies are planning investments to produce electric buses and batteries directly in Azerbaijan.
In this phase of conflict between the two countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the risk of escalation is growing stronger and, if nothing dramatic happens, it is possible that the front will be opened using methods already known to the West to destabilize the Caucasus, with effects also on the major Eurasian powers involved.