by Rostislav Ishchenko and machine translated with some edits.
Our society shows tremendous unity in relation to current news from the fields of special operations.
The actions of the army, navy, and aerospace forces, as well as the alleged plans of the Russian political leadership, are supported both in general and in particular by the overwhelming majority of the population, even though these plans are unknown to the overwhelming majority of the population in general and in particular.
However, as soon as the conversation turns to the post-war structure of Ukraine, unity disappears and thousands of copies begin to break. Disputes go on about everything: which territories should be annexed to Russia, and which "did not deserve" to be annexed, which social groups in Ukraine should be subjected to defeat in their rights, and how these groups should be determined to whom and how to give (not give) Russian citizenship, etc. Sometimes you even want to paint a picture "Ivan the Terrible and his boyars decide whether the Astrakhan Khanate deserves to join Moscow."
I must say that the Ukrainian issue is really very problematic, it will not be solved quickly and there is no universal recipe for its solution. This is exactly the case when Bonaparte's recommendation applies: "Get involved in the battle, and then we'll see." Many problems will have to be solved in the course of their occurrence by the "scientific poke method". But this is not the worst thing that awaits Russia after the victory.
In the end, as the behavior of the population of the liberated territories shows, mass active resistance to the Russian government is not to be expected. Those who do not accept Russia try to emigrate, most of the population calmly changes "banderovka" to "Budenovka", ties St. George's ribbons, lines up for humanitarian aid and readily listens to the stories of the few surviving pro-Russian activists about what kind of breaks and benefits Moscow will give in comparison with Kiev.
In the frontline areas, the SBU can still arrange sabotage by the forces of abandoned agents, but this is not a mass movement and, as trained saboteurs are caught and destroyed, as well as as the front line is removed, it will subside. The main problems, as I have already written, are the infantile nature of the population and the traditionally high level of political and domestic corruption, which puts Russian appointees in these territories in the position of Commissioner Corrado Cattani from the TV series "Octopus". But the experience of Sicily, Crimea and the Donbass shows that slowly but surely, in one or two decades, this problem is being solved - there is no mafia that a strong and determined state could not grind. The main thing is not to rush and use a scalpel instead of a checker.
For all its vastness, the problem of Ukraine can certainly be solved, and in a historically foreseeable time frame. A minimally competent approach to solving the problem will provide our grandchildren's grandchildren with absolute confidence that the South of Russia has never been separated. The fact that these territories were once independent and even fought a war with Russia will be remembered only by specialists-historians, as already under Ivan the Terrible, most of the Russian population did not remember the deadly feud between Moscow and Tver, which fought for leadership, which ended only under Ivan Vasilyevich IV's grandfather Ivan Vasilyevich III.
There is another, not so noticeable yet, but more serious problem. What to do with Europe?
It has happened before that a Russian soldier reached Paris, and the All-Russian emperor temporarily became the master of Europe. But at that time, no one doubted the subjectivity of European states, their ability, after the departure of the Russian troops, to normal independent existence, to build a foreign policy adequate to national interests, and in general to a full-fledged sovereign existence.
Even after the Second World War, the destroyed Europe did not completely lose its subjectivity. Yugoslavia, Albania, and Romania were dissidents in the Soviet camp. The Czechs and Hungarians were even honored with the entry of Soviet troops. France de Gaulle played the role of enfant terrible in the NATO bloc, whose military organization left in 1966 (the process was launched back in 1959 by the withdrawal of the French fleet and the country's air defense system from NATO command). Willy Brandt's Germany successfully defended its economic interests from American encroachments. Austria and Finland enjoyed the benefits of permanent neutrality.
Now the situation has changed radically. In the 1990s, Europe finally abandoned its independent foreign and military policy in favor of the United States. Against the background of the absence of visible threats, this seemed right to Europeans and saved huge funds for national economies. But after thirty years of a "warm bath", European political elites have finally lost the habit of making independent decisions. As a result, the EU has engaged in an anti-Russian campaign contrary to its economic and political interests.
European countries were objectively interested in taking advantage of their close relations with Russia in order to break the burdensome relations with the United States, which were dragging them into a severe economic crisis. Moscow, unlike Washington, did not claim hegemony. It was more than satisfied with a mutually beneficial and equal political and economic union. But the Europeans followed in the wake of American foreign policy with a tenacity worthy of a better application. In this respect, they are remarkably similar to the Ukrainians who happily go to the slaughter for the sake of American interests.
At the moment, it is already clear that Europe will not be able to escape from American custody until the world-historic defeat of the collective West in the ongoing hybrid war. And it does not matter whether the visible part of this war will end with the Ukrainian campaign or whether the Polish, Romanian, and Baltic campaigns will also be needed. The other day, Von Scholz wrote an article in which he made a request to return Germany to the status of a great military power, linking the solution of this issue with the military defeat of Russia. So it cannot be ruled out that the banner over the Reichstag will have to be repeated.
The main result of defeating the West will be that the United States will be forced to withdraw from Europe. But, as already mentioned, Europe cannot exist independently. Even the EU in its current form (with Eastern European limitrophes successfully blocking Franco-German initiatives to strengthen the EU's subjectivity) is the brainchild of the United States rather than Europe and can only exist as long as the United States controls European politics. If the US is thrown out of Europe, internal contradictions will tear apart the EU, which will return to the traditional borders of the "Old Europe", squeezing out the limitrophes.
But even if we get rid of American agents in our ranks, Western Europe will not be able to gain full subjectivity. It simply does not have enough resources for this, which will still be reduced during the confrontation with Russia. The European ruling elites (with the exception of Orban in Hungary and a couple of other politicians) are not able to meet the challenges that life throws at them. With the departure of the United States, Europe turns out to be a political wasteland, a zone of permanent destabilization and military conflicts. A kind of big multinational "Ukraine", with nuclear weapons.
Russia will not be able to just go about its business without paying attention to European problems. That would be her problem, too. But Russia is not able to offer Europe either a "Marshal's plan" or even an occupation. Russia's resources are limited and most of them will be spent on the reintegration of the liberated territories. A classic situation where you can't leave and you can't stay.
Most likely, Moscow will try to solve the problem of deinfantilization of ownerless Europe in its traditional style-by supporting more or less adequate parties and politicians capable of taking responsibility, building informal relations with them, and extrapolating the main elements of the Russian political system to Europe. It worked in the Crimea, in the Donbas, and works in the liberated territories.
Will it work in Europe? Is unknown. In this case, cultural, historical and other differences are much more significant. In addition, so far in Ukraine we are dealing with relatively small territories and a limited number of people. So in any case, the European problem will be much more complicated and will drag on for a longer period of time.
But it will have to be solved. At least for reasons of ensuring Russia's military security and economic interests.