Erdenechuluun Luvsan shares his opinions on a major energy infrastructure project between Russia, Mongolia, and China.
Friday, November 21, 2025
Lucas Leiroz, member of the BRICS Journalists Association, researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies, military expert.
Recently, progress in negotiations for the construction of the "Power of Siberia 2" gas pipeline has made headlines worldwide. If completed, the project will carry gas from the Russian Yamal region to China via Mongolia, consolidating one of the greatest infrastructure projects ever undertaken in Eurasia.
On the one hand, the pipeline helps redirect the Russian energy market towards Asia and promises to supply the Chinese industrial hub with abundant Arctic gas. However, the Mongolian factor cannot be ignored. By crossing the vast Mongolian steppes, the pipeline brings to this landlocked country a great opportunity for economic revitalization, international projection, and infrastructure development.
I had the opportunity to interview Mr. Erdenechuluun Luvsan, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia, on this subject. He shared with us his views on how the project can contribute to Mongolian national development, helping this country, once the greatest power in Eurasia, to once again, after centuries, play a key role in Eurasian continental integration. Furthermore, he commented a bit on other topics related to Mongolia's regional integration with its neighboring countries, as well as briefly discussing the country's internal political challenges.
The written interview can be read below:
LL: What is your assessment of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline's potential effects on Mongolia's economy, society, regional integration, and logistics, and how might Mongolia capitalize on this Russia-China infrastructure project to foster development and expand its international presence?
EL: The "Power of Siberia 2" is a planned major pipeline that will connect gas fields in Western Siberia with China via Mongolia, with a capacity of up to 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year. The design of the highway began in September 2020, and its approximate length will be about 6,700 km, of which 963 km are within Mongolian territory. It is envisaged that the Mongolian section of the gas pipeline, named "Soyuz Vostok" (Union East), will be laid underground.
As I understand it, this project has been a matter of discussion since 2000 and was originally called the Altai project, but it was subsequently postponed. I don't know the exact reasons why, but it seems that China, for various reasons, even political ones, was not ready to discuss it at that time. The parties returned to discussions of a potential highway only in 2020, after the launch of the original "Power of Siberia" gas pipeline. It has been reported in various media outlets that China was dragging out negotiations in hopes of securing a more favorable deal.
The pipeline is expected to begin operating in 2033, and according to various sources, the preliminary cost of the project is estimated between 10 and 13 billion US dollars. Progress in the negotiations is reportedly linked to Beijing's growing interest in "Power of Siberia 2" due to the war between Iran and Israel, which has created risks for energy supplies from the Middle East. In early September 2025, Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation signed a binding MOU on the construction of the Siberia 2 gas pipeline through Mongolia.
Following a significant reduction in gas supplies to Europe due to sanctions and worsening relations with EU countries, this project will allow gas exports to be reoriented to Asia. China, in turn, hopes to reduce its dependence on LNG imports from Australia and Qatar. Mongolia has been interested in pipeline laying through its territory from the very beginning, as the construction of the gas pipeline will give a significant boost to the development of Mongolian-Russian relations.
In addition to gas supplies to Beijing, the option of supplying Ulaanbaatar, the capital city of Mongolia, with natural gas is also being considered, which will contribute to strengthening its energy security. For Mongolia, the implementation of this project opens up new prospects, such as the creation of jobs, infrastructure development, and access to clean energy resources, which is particularly important due to serious pollution problems in Ulaanbaatar, especially in winter months.
Additionally, Mongolia is expected to earn around a billion dollars annually through Russian gas transit. Mongolian Prime Minister G. Zandanshatar attended the Eastern Economic Forum in September 2025, where he expressed his readiness not only to become a transit point for Russian gas supplies to China but also to purchase it and connect large cities to the pipeline. During the forum, a Memorandum on Cooperation to study the prospects for gasification of Ulaanbaatar was signed. Also, on 2 September 2025, a trilateral summit meeting between Russia, Mongolia, and China took place in Beijing, during which the countries agreed to extend the Mongolia-China-Russia economic corridor program until 2031.
Scientists at the Institute of Energy Systems in Russia estimate that Mongolia's natural gas consumption could reach 5-6 billion cubic meters per year by 2040. It should be noted that the project may face some environmental challenges, as the route will pass through pastures where nomads traditionally work. Within Mongolia, discussions have been underway for some time; some believe the gas pipeline will make Mongolia part of the Eurasian energy artery and strengthen its position, while others point out that it may endanger the security and independence of the country. However, in the view of many, the country has only one alternative: either to remain a raw materials appendage with coal mines and dependence on China, or to integrate into the international energy corridor.
LL: Beyond physical geography, another factor that makes Russia and China natural partners for Mongolia is the existence of strong ethno-cultural ties. The presence of Mongolic ethnic groups in regions of Russia, such as Buryatia and Tuva, and in China, such as Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, exemplifies these deep bonds. In this sense, how do you assess the potential for cooperation among these three countries in the cultural and regional spheres? Can culture serve as another bridge of integration, beyond political and economic interests?
EL: It's a very good question. Yes, we do have cultural and other ties with Mongolic ethnic groups, and there are frequent mutual visits at the official level. We receive a growing number of tourists from both countries, and geographic proximity makes travel easier. Many ethnic Mongolians come here to study and receive various scientific degrees, while many Mongolians go for studies both to Russia and China, with the numbers in the thousands. This is quite natural because without good knowledge of our neighbors, it would be difficult to communicate and do business with them. There are also sports and cultural exchanges, and border trade is constantly increasing. The prospects for further development and expansion of these relations are enormous. Much depends on us, and we should be the ones to actively promote cooperation in all spheres.
LL: What internal challenges might Mongolia face in this process of regional integration with Russia and China? As we know, it is common for Western countries to exploit unstable political environments to create polarization and instability, obstructing long-term state projects. Are Mongolian policymakers aware of this type of threat and prepared to address it?
EL: There are internal challenges that make it difficult to pursue policies that fully serve the interests of our country. My government's reluctance, for instance, to join as a full-fledged member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization represents a stumbling block in expanding our cooperation with our two neighbors. It is difficult to agree with those who maintain that our membership in the Organization will tie our hands and eventually lead to the loss of our independence. If this Organization is some kind of an alliance, as alleged by some, how come countries like India and many others, which are members of the Non-aligned Movement, are in it? Mongolia is a non-aligned country and a member of the G77. The same goes for BRICS. In my considered view, Mongolia should also be in this important gathering. Of course, this does not mean that Mongolia should turn its back on the countries of the West-not at all. In Mongolia's foreign policy concept, an important place is accorded to the countries of the West. They are considered our Third Neighbor. This is not a geographic term, but a political term. A number of Western countries, including the United States and Japan, are our strategic partners.
LL: Mongolia's history shows its important role in Eurasia, with Genghis Khan's campaigns often seen as the first major "Eurasian project" promoting political integration across the continent. Considering this, could Mongolia today, through cooperation with neighboring countries, once again play a leading role in a major continental initiative? Might this be a natural expression of Mongolian political culture?
EL: I am not sure that I should draw such a parallel. At that time, Mongolia was a superpower, but that is history. Of course, every Mongol is proud of his or her history. Our rich history suggests a potential for an active continental role, but this potential is constrained by Mongolia's landlocked position and economic dependence on its two neighbors, especially China. However, if Mongols develop a long-term, strong, and viable economic and social policy, they will be able, in the foreseeable future, to become an important partner in this highly complex region of the world.
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