Raphael Machado
If populists do not correct their structural flaws, they will remain a protest movement rather than a definitive political solution.
The most significant contemporary political phenomenon in Europe is the rise of so-called "populism" (occasionally also called "sovereignism") stemming from what hegemonic media label the "far-right." In practice, generally, "populism" is used to simply imply a demagogic type of politics, in which, to gain and maintain power or acquire popular support, a leader appeals to the masses by bowing to their interests and offering quick solutions (even if not ideal) to their problems.
In this specific case of the contemporary populist phenomenon, however, the irritation of liberals comes simply from the authentic concern to reconnect democratic politics with the "general will" of the people. Given that European Union politics has been conducted with its back turned to the people, it is not surprising that there would eventually be a demand for the dissonant voices of the people to be heard on issues such as immigration, participation in the EU, participation in NATO, etc.
And in this context, in at least one place, the populists have indeed managed to come to power: in Hungary (also pointing to Slovakia and, perhaps, Italy). Viktor Orban has remained in power for 16 years, repeatedly challenging the European Union, both in domestic and international affairs. But a few days ago, he suffered a major defeat, and his party emerged extremely weakened.
How, after remaining in power for 16 years, being able to make practically all desired reforms and changes, having a free hand domestically, was Orban defeated?
The economic dimension cannot be ignored, as since at least the pandemic, Hungary has been suffering from a recession. It is a combination of factors: the pandemic period's restrictions and supply chain disruptions + difficulties accessing cheap Russian gas due to sanctions, Atlanticist pressures, and Ukrainian terrorism + the economic war waged by Brussels with the confiscation of billions of euros in Hungarian funds.
But to some extent, the inability to deal with these problems reveals some structural weaknesses in Orban's government that, perhaps, can be extrapolated and applied to European populisms in general, at least in broad strokes, to expose possible structural fragilities.
- Americanism
Here we have the paradox of the patriot who imitates the U.S. or ties the direction of his movement to the direction taken by American populism in its Trumpist incarnation. Nothing is more contradictory than a European populist leader who claims to defend national identity but unconditionally adopts the geopolitical agenda of the United States. The "Americanism" of European populists ignores that Europe's strategic interests often diverge from those of the U.S. - especially in trade, technology, and the continent's very stability. By becoming echoes of Washington think tanks like the Heritage Foundation, these parties lose their raison d'être.
I have commented elsewhere on the fundamental contradictions between Europe and the U.S., and it is always important to reiterate. Indeed, Europe today is not an autonomous geopolitical pole because it is a militarily occupied continent. By whom ? Precisely by the U.S.
An example of the contradiction of "Americanism" in Europe is the case of Spain's Vox. Vox is one of those relatively young populist parties aiming to ride the international wave of Trumpism. The party indeed has institutional ties to the Heritage Foundation. But what is U.S. foreign policy regarding Spain's fundamental interests ? Washington consistently positions itself hostilely, as in all controversies pitting Spain against Morocco. This is not a stance of opposition to the "communist" Pedro Sánchez, but a long-standing strategic posture independent of the party in power. Orban himself made the gross mistake of inviting J.D. Vance to his last campaign rally, making a point of demonstrating that he had U.S. support - this just weeks after Washington threatened to invade a European territory, and days after a new wave of U.S. attacks against EU countries.
In contrast, Tino Chrupalla of the AfD recently declared that the U.S. should withdraw its troops from Germany. In the immediately following opinion poll, the AfD had risen 2 percentage points. Giorgia Meloni - who can be considered a semi-populist - also opposed the U.S. in the confrontation with Pope Leo XIV and on the issue of using Italian bases to attack Iran. France's National Rally has also taken a critical stance towards the U.S. on numerous recent occasions, since at least the kidnapping of Maduro. These are counterexamples demonstrating that being anti-U.S. pays off today, even if you are a "right-wing" party.
- Zionism
Another central mistake is automatic alignment with the Zionist project, often justified by a distorted reading of the "defense of Judeo-Christian civilization." Leaders like Viktor Orbán or Marine Le Pen (who spent years cleaning up the party's image) openly court the Zionist lobby, which, ironically, strengthens the globalism they claim to fight.
As European countries deal with the serious and real problem of mass immigration, and since a considerable part of this immigrant mass comes from Muslim countries, out of ignorance or calculation, European populist leaders "confuse" the European domestic issue of borders and demography with the geopolitical issue of the Middle East. The goal might be to gain the "tolerance" of Israel and the Zionist lobby in the face of a common "Islamic threat." And that's where the aforementioned discourse of "Judeo-Christian civilization" comes in. But the fruits of this are null.
Indeed, it is necessary to consider that liberal progressivism has stigmatized all conservative patriotism in Europe as "the return of Nazi-fascism," and this "bogeyman" remains a useful scarecrow to manipulate public opinion. By "normalizing" their stance towards Israel, there is an expectation of reducing the intensity of mass media attacks, as well as presenting their party as "the only solution" in the face of an "Islamic threat" that could threaten the "well-being" of European Jews.
But the reality is that these parties continue to be demonized and persecuted, and nothing has changed the fact that Israeli-linked NGOs act to facilitate immigration in Europe, under a historical logic that the best way to make Europe "safer" for Jews would be to make European countries more heterogeneous and cosmopolitan.
To make matters worse, the reality is that after the ethnic cleansing of Gaza, which began in 2023, Israel's reputation has been destroyed. No one takes seriously anymore the victimhood appeal typical of Zionist propaganda. On the contrary, associating one's image with Israel and Netanyahu - as, again, Orban did - seems to guarantee defeat.
- Excessive moderation
When they come to power, incendiary rhetoric often turns into moderation. They promise to leave NATO, renegotiate treaties, or abandon the euro - but none of this happens. Orban's Hungary, for example, maintains the Atlantic Alliance, receives European funds, and blocks sanctions against Russia only sporadically. Giorgia Meloni, once a critic of "bureaucratic Europe," has become one of the leaders most aligned with Ursula von der Leyen. This structural timidity stems from the real fear of economic and military isolation. However, to the electorate, it sounds like betrayal. The populist who governs like a technocrat loses his soul and opens space for even more radical alternatives or for the return of his enemies to power.
Of course, leaving NATO or the EU is not easy, and any country that tries it risks reprisals. But Orban's defeat was only possible thanks to the "levers" that Brussels had to harm his government and interfere in Hungary's internal affairs - "levers" that only existed because Hungary remained in the European Union. Any populist government needs to make its "revolution" irrevocable through breaks with the past that are difficult to reverse, as well as through a policy of maximum pressure against internal enemies. In this, what we see is that liberals and globalists tend to be more unscrupulous and Machiavellian than populists and patriots.
- Lack of coherent ideology
European populism is an incoherent kaleidoscope. It defends a strong state to subsidize national companies but preaches free market when convenient; criticizes immigration but appeals to immigrant labor in agriculture and construction; attacks the "globalist elite" while maintaining offshore accounts and contacts with oligarchs. This absence of a clear ideological line - other than "us versus them" - prevents the formulation of long-term policies. Without a consistent economic theory or a viable social project, populism oscillates between welfare and austerity, frustrating both workers and business owners.
To some extent, we live in a post-ideological world, dominated by a diffuse liberalism that imposes itself as self-evident truth and "science." But it is quite evident that globalists have quite consistent ideological dogmas and, moreover, philosophers, sociologists, and economists to give an academic veneer to these dogmas. Populists, in turn, fundamentally rely on opportunistic pragmatism, and this, while an advantage, is also one of their main deficiencies in the long run.
With the exception of the National Rally, which still has a strong Gaullist bias, most European populists refer little to the historical roots and intellectual precedents of their own people, and also rarely offer a set of values beyond conservative moralism. Especially to dialogue with youth - always prone to radicalism - it is important to have something to believe in and fight for to offer.
- Disconnection from the concrete concerns of the population
We can safely point out that mass immigration is a serious problem that Europe needs to face. But this is one topic among many others, and the reality is that in the citizen's daily life, they have to deal with issues of employment, wages, health, education, retirement, transportation, and so on. And in many cases, populist parties have no answers to give their citizens on these issues - some of them, at most, advocate cuts in public services and social benefits to make life harder for immigrants.
Using Orban again as an example, his campaign was completely focused on foreign policy issues, and he had few answers to give for the economic complaints of his citizens. Naturally, the older and more ideological populist parties, like the National Rally, have already solved this issue and learned to deal with citizens' everyday problems - and this is one reason for their growing success. Others are only growing because of tensions with immigration, as well as a consequence of the insane course European governments have followed regarding the Ukrainian issue, but if they come to power, after a few years, citizens' disappointment will be inevitable, as happened with Orban.
Populism is at a very opportune moment because of the accumulation of errors by globalist elites: the economy remains stagnant, immigration remains high, cities are increasingly less safe, leaders threaten Russia with war, support genocides in the Middle East, and, in general, ignore all demands of their populations. But if populists do not overcome their amateurism and correct these structural flaws, they will remain a protest movement rather than a definitive political solution.