Lorenzo Maria Pacini
The Middle Eastern crises of 2026 mark a moment of structural discontinuity in Indian foreign policy.
A strategic player in the region
Ahead of the BRICS+ plenary session in Delhi, it is necessary to analyze in greater detail the role of India-which holds the presidency this year-in the most sensitive contexts of this period.
Over the past three decades, India has progressively and profoundly transformed its role in the Middle Eastern system, evolving from a mere trade and energy partner to a geopolitical and geoeconomic player of growing significance. This process, which began concurrently with the end of the Cold War and the economic reforms of the 1990s, has led New Delhi to redefine the epistemological foundations of its foreign policy: from a model inspired by the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement to a pragmatic, multilateral, and selectively assertive approach toward a region perceived as structurally indispensable to India's international projection.
From a geoeconomic perspective, the Middle East has established itself as India's primary energy supply base. Rapid industrial and demographic growth has generated unprecedented demand for hydrocarbons, making relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Qatar, and Iraq a strategic priority. At the same time, the Gulf monarchies have assumed the role of structural financial partners: sovereign wealth funds have channeled billions of dollars into the infrastructure, logistics, energy transition, and advanced technology sectors of the Indian economy.
The human dimension constitutes a further element of primary analytical importance. Since the 1990s, millions of Indian workers have settled in the Gulf countries, giving rise to one of the largest diasporas in the contemporary world. Indian expatriates now represent an essential component of the Gulf economies, while the remittances they send home constitute a crucial source of macro-financial stability for India. This structural interdependence has progressively oriented New Delhi's diplomacy toward a growing focus on regional security and the consular protection of its citizens.
On the geopolitical front, India has pursued a strategy of balancing between often antagonistic actors. Historically close to Arab countries and a supporter of the Palestinian cause within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement, New Delhi has gradually intensified relations with Israel following the diplomatic normalization of 1992. During the 2000s, Israel became one of the main suppliers of military technology and defense systems, giving rise to progressively deepened strategic cooperation in the sectors of security, intelligence, and dual-use technological innovation.
At the same time, India has maintained functional relations with Iran, identified as a geostrategic partner for access to Central Asia and Afghanistan, as an alternative to Pakistani land routes. The Chabahar port project, supported by New Delhi, represents the most emblematic expression of this vision: a logistics corridor designed to bypass Pakistan and counter the expansion of Chinese influence in the region, within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative.
In recent years, India has further strengthened its cooperation with the Gulf monarchies, including in the political and security spheres. Bilateral agreements on defense, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, infrastructure investment, and energy transition have solidified New Delhi's profile as a reliable and independent partner. A significant indicator of this evolution is India's entry into new regional multilateral frameworks, including the I2U2 format-India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States-designed to promote economic, technological, and strategic integration among its members.
It is within this long-term context that the transformation of Indian policy in the contemporary Middle East and its growing diplomatic assertiveness in the crisis scenarios of 2026 must be understood.
Multi-alignment and attempts at balanced positioning
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, we must theoretically frame the strategy adopted by New Delhi. The concept of multi-alignment, already employed among emerging middle powers, entails an international posture that rejects both passive non-alignment and exclusive integration into alliance blocs, opting instead for a flexible and context-dependent network of privileged relationships with diverse and sometimes antagonistic actors.
In India's case, this approach is rooted in the Nehruvian tradition of strategic autonomy, reinterpreted in a pragmatic light by successive administrations. While the original doctrine favored maintaining an equal distance from the blocs, contemporary multi-alignment involves selective and simultaneous engagement with multiple poles of power, calibrated according to sectoral national interests. India therefore maintains deep defense ties with the United States through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), sustains significant energy and trade partnerships with Russia, cultivates structural economic relations with China, and, at the same time, projects influence in the Middle East through multiple bilateral and multilateral channels. Multiple positions simultaneously-sometimes not easy to manage.
The Middle East crises of 2026 subjected this model to unprecedented pressure. The simultaneous escalation on multiple fronts has made traditional tactical neutrality increasingly difficult, forcing New Delhi to take more explicit positions while seeking to preserve its decision-making autonomy. The outcome of this structural tension is a form of dynamic multi-alignment, in which relative priorities among the various partnership axes are redefined according to evolving circumstances.
A key turning point was undoubtedly the shift in relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates-a pivot from cooperation to competition. The understanding between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, long regarded as the cornerstone of stability within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), has gradually transformed into open strategic competition, with destabilizing implications for the entire regional system. The rift, which had been simmering for years due to divergent geopolitical visions and hegemonic ambitions, emerged unequivocally in December 2025, when the Southern Transitional Council (STC), backed by the UAE, launched an offensive in the Yemeni provinces of Hadhramaut and al-Mahra. Saudi Arabia interpreted this expansion as a direct threat to its southern security and as the manifestation of an Emirati plan aimed at creating a pro-Abu Dhabi separatist entity within Yemeni territory.
This tension quickly spread to other regional theaters, taking on the characteristics of a systemic rivalry. In Sudan, competition between the two monarchies helped fuel the civil war: the United Arab Emirates supported the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to control strategic trade routes and gold resources, while Riyadh backed the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Profound differences have also emerged regarding the Israeli issue: Abu Dhabi has progressively intensified military and intelligence cooperation with Tel Aviv under the Abraham Accords, while Saudi Arabia has interpreted this rapprochement as a threat to its own regional preeminence, consequently strengthening ties with Pakistan and Turkey.
For India, this dynamic required the development of an extremely sophisticated management strategy. New Delhi found itself needing to preserve economic and security relations with both Gulf monarchies, while avoiding being perceived as aligned with one or the other. A development of particular analytical significance was the United Arab Emirates' formal withdrawal from OPEC in May 2026, after nearly sixty years of membership in the oil cartel. Abu Dhabi's decision, motivated by frustration with production quotas determined primarily by Saudi influence, reduced the collective weight of the cartel and strengthened the negotiating position of major importing countries, among which India plays a leading role.
The Indian government promptly seized this geopolitical window of opportunity. In April 2026, it imported approximately 620,000 barrels per day of oil from the Emirates, not subject to OPEC quota restrictions, a quantity corresponding to about 10-14% of the country's total oil imports. Transactions were further facilitated through payment mechanisms in rupees and dirhams, reducing dependence on the U.S. dollar and limiting India's exposure to the volatility of Western financial markets. This choice reflects not only a strategy of supplier diversification but also a strategy of progressive de-dollarization of energy trade, consistent with broader trends in international political economy.
At the same time, to prevent Riyadh from interpreting the intensification of relations with Abu Dhabi as a hostile signal, India simultaneously strengthened economic cooperation with Saudi Arabia, securing investment commitments totaling $10 billion for green hydrogen projects on Indian soil. This dual strategy of selective engagement effectively illustrates the operational mechanisms of dynamic multi-alignment: New Delhi does not choose between its partners, but calibrates the intensity of its relationships according to contingent interests, keeping all diplomatic and economic channels open.
Attempts at geoeconomic diplomacy in the Iranian crisis
The escalation of Israeli-U.S. military action against Iran has caused far-reaching shocks for the Indian economy as well. For India, which relies on external sources for approximately 88% of its crude oil needs and 90% of its LPG, the situation required the adoption of timely and comprehensive response measures. The crisis has also threatened one of the most significant infrastructure projects in India's geoeconomic strategy: the Iranian port of Chabahar, conceived as an alternative logistics corridor to connect India to Afghanistan and Central Asia without transiting through Pakistani territory, and at the same time to reduce the importance of the Chinese port of Gwadar within the Belt and Road Initiative. On April 26, 2026, upon the expiration of the U.S. sanctions waiver that had protected Indian activities in Chabahar, New Delhi adopted a pragmatic solution that merits in-depth analysis. To avoid exposure to secondary sanctions from Washington, India formally reduced its direct stake in the port, transferring part of its operational shares to local Iranian legal entities. Through this structural solution, New Delhi maintained its operational and managerial role in the port facility without appearing as the direct owner of the restricted infrastructure, thereby preserving the asset's strategic value while accepting a temporary contraction in commercial activities. This solution clearly illustrates India's ability to operate within the constraints of international regulations through legally creative solutions, without compromising its underlying strategic objectives.
To put it more clearly, the approach adopted by New Delhi regarding the Iranian crisis reflects, more generally, a geoeconomic vision of foreign policy: the defense of national interests occurs primarily through economic, logistical, and commercial instruments, rather than through formal diplomatic stances that would risk compromising relational balances painstakingly built over time. And this principle has been consistent over the years, with any actor on the global stage.
The problem called "Israel"
There is, however, a sore spot that public opinion often attributes to contemporary India as an original sin: its support for Israel. With the progressive deterioration of the regional order in the Middle East, India has undertaken a profound redefinition of its diplomatic stance in the Levant, and the transition from cautious neutrality to a more explicit strategic collaboration with Israel became evident during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's official visit to Israel on February 25-26, 2026. This marked the first time an Indian head of government addressed the Knesset in the midst of an ongoing regional conflict-a break from India's traditional reserve regarding the Levant, laden with symbolic and political significance.
The Indo-Israeli partnership now spans a wide range of sectors: from advanced technological cooperation to intelligence sharing, from the joint production of military systems to collaboration on cybersecurity and missile defense. Israel views this collaboration as part of a broader framework of relations with non-Western democracies aimed at sharing deterrence capabilities against revisionist actors. For India, the added value of the partnership with Tel Aviv lies primarily in privileged access to advanced military technologies that help fuel the strategy of modernizing the Armed Forces and reducing dependence on the traditional Russian supply chain.
However, this rapprochement entails significant diplomatic risks that the Indian leadership must manage with extreme caution. Iran views the axis between New Delhi and Tel Aviv with growing suspicion, interpreting it as a form of implicit support for Western strategies aimed at isolating the Islamic Republic. This perception could gradually erode India's traditional role as a balanced interlocutor in the region and foster a closer alignment between Tehran and Islamabad, with potential repercussions for the stability of India's northwestern border. At the same time, the increasingly visible ties with Israel compel New Delhi to carefully manage its relations with the Gulf monarchies. Over 10 million Indian workers reside in these countries, sending approximately $45 billion in remittances back home annually: a crucial component for the financial stability and social cohesion of entire regions of India. Public opinion in the Gulf states is highly sensitive to the Palestinian issue, making it politically delicate for the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula to maintain fully normal relations with an India that appears excessively aligned with the Israeli position.
The protection of Indian citizens abroad is a strategic priority that has taken on growing importance within the framework of New Delhi's foreign policy. A particularly significant case study is provided by Operation Sindhu, conducted between June 18 and 27, 2025: in the early stages of the military escalation in the region, with the closure of major airspace, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs coordinated the evacuation of 4,429 citizens from Iran. Via land routes leading to Armenia, followed by charter flights from Yerevan to New Delhi, the operation concluded without casualties, demonstrating the remarkable logistical and operational capabilities of the Indian diplomatic-consular apparatus. The risk remains, however, that a prolonged conflict could destabilize Gulf labor markets, with serious economic consequences for Indian regions historically dependent on remittances from emigrants. The protection of the diaspora is therefore not merely a matter of consular protection, but a structural variable of Indian foreign policy, intertwined with domestic financial stability and long-term geostrategic calculations.
What role in the multipolar Middle East?
The Middle Eastern crises of 2026 mark a moment of structural discontinuity in Indian foreign policy. Faced with the deterioration of intra-GCC cohesion, the geopolitical consequences of the war in Iran, and the redefinition of the regional security architecture, India has progressively abandoned its traditional passive neutrality, opting for a more dynamic, assertive, and articulated multi-alignment strategy. The simultaneous management of the rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the Iranian escalation, and the strengthening of the partnership with Israel constitutes an increasingly sophisticated foreign policy approach, combining economic, diplomatic, and security tools within an integrated framework.
The exploitation of new energy dynamics resulting from the United Arab Emirates' withdrawal from OPEC, the pragmatic solution adopted to preserve operations at the port of Chabahar despite U.S. sanctions pressure, and the consolidation of military and technological cooperation with Israel concretely illustrate how New Delhi is seeking to protect its economic growth from the region's structural instability, without, however, relinquishing its strategic autonomy.
The long-term success of this strategy will depend on India's ability to navigate the contradictions of the new multipolar order without compromising the diplomatic balances necessary to safeguard its core interests: energy security, the protection of the diaspora, and access to markets and advanced technologies. In this sense, the transformation of Indian policy in the Middle East is not merely a contingent response to a period of crisis, but the manifestation of a broader strategic project: that of an India aspiring to be recognized as a responsible and indispensable global power, capable of projecting influence in the most complex theaters of the contemporary international system.
Looking ahead, future research should focus in particular on the dynamics of interaction between India's Middle Eastern projection and its relations with the other major powers - the United States, China, and Russia - in an effort to assess whether dynamic multi-alignment can constitute a replicable and sustainable model in the long term, or whether, rather, the systemic pressures of the emerging bipolar order will tend to progressively reduce the room for maneuver that New Delhi's policymakers have so far been able to exploit with considerable skill.