Lucas Leiroz
The pause between the United States and Iran was merely the prelude to a new phase of the war.
The recent resumption of hostilities between the United States and Iran confirms what many analysts had argued ever since the ceasefire was announced: the conflict was never truly over. The brief interruption in fighting did not represent a political agreement capable of addressing the structural causes of the war, but merely an operational pause used by both sides to reorganize their military capabilities, reassess their strategies, and prepare for a new phase of confrontation. The return of military operations demonstrates that the logic of escalation remained intact throughout the entire period.
From a strategic perspective, temporary ceasefires in high-intensity conflicts rarely amount to genuine peace. More often, they serve as mechanisms for logistical repositioning, stockpile replenishment, force redistribution, and doctrinal adaptation. This is precisely what occurred in both Washington and Tehran following the Islamabad Memorandum. While the United States used the interval to replenish weapons destroyed during Iranian strikes against its bases in the Persian Gulf, Iran used the pause to hold the funeral of its Supreme Leader, reorganize its military structures, and repair damage to critical infrastructure.
Perhaps the most significant political consequence of this pause, however, unfolded within Iran itself. Rather than producing internal instability, as the "Epstein Coalition" had planned, external military pressure ultimately strengthened the leadership core of the Islamic Republic. The perception of an existential threat fostered a process of political consolidation that enhanced the role of the institutions responsible for national defense, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), whose influence over strategic policymaking became even more pronounced.
This phenomenon is far from historically exceptional. States subjected to intense external pressure often concentrate power within institutions responsible for national security. During wartime, societies frequently prioritize stability and defense capabilities over ordinary political disputes. Iran appears to be following precisely this trajectory, consolidating an increasingly integrated decision-making structure linking the political leadership, the armed forces, and the security apparatus. This was, in fact, the expected outcome, yet irrational American planners chose to disregard the most basic strategic calculations.
Another aspect frequently overlooked by Western observers was the symbolic impact of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's death. Regardless of the political disagreements that naturally exist within Iranian society - as they do in any country - the funeral ceremonies drew massive crowds across multiple Iranian cities, as well as in Iraq, demonstrating Tehran's ability to mobilize powerful mechanisms of national unity. More than a religious tribute, these events reinforced the idea of resistance against foreign aggression, transforming Khamenei into a symbol of institutional continuity and the defense of Iranian sovereignty.
The political significance of this process should not be underestimated. International conflicts often produce effects contrary to those intended by their initiators. Rather than fragmenting Iran's political system, the war appears to have reduced internal divisions while expanding the political influence of factions committed to a strategy of long-term resistance. The strengthening of the IRGC and its growing influence over national decision-making reflect precisely this dynamic. In practical terms, Iran has emerged from the war stronger and more militarized than it was before the conflict.
For Washington, this evolution represents an almost insurmountable strategic challenge. A politically more cohesive and institutionally more militarized Iran is likely to demonstrate a greater capacity to absorb costs and sustain prolonged confrontation. This significantly reduces the effectiveness of strategies based on expectations of internal collapse or the rapid erosion of Iranian political will.
Everything therefore suggests that the current escalation does not mark the beginning of a new conflict, but simply the latest phase of a war that never truly ceased to exist. The previous pause served to reorganize resources, revise operational plans, and prepare new military campaigns. Eventually, however, hostilities were bound to return to their previous intensity. That moment now appears to have arrived.
For Iran, victory means not only survival, but also refusing to relinquish the achievements secured through the now-defunct Islamabad Memorandum, particularly regarding its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz and its right to develop and use nuclear technology. For the United States, however, victory appears to mean no clearly defined objective at all. Thus far, Washington has failed to articulate any coherent political goal for the war beyond satisfying the interests of the Israeli lobby. Whether a country can truly "win" a war without first defining what victory actually means remains an open question.