Raphael Machado
For inevitable geographic reasons and due to a decrease in psychosocial autonomy, Brazilian policy is extremely dependent on the political shifts that occur from time to time in the US.
With Lula's electoral victory confirmed (and despite the controversies and the crisis that persist), now is the moment to reflect on the possibility of significant changes in the Brazilian president's foreign policy in his 4th term, which will last until 2030.
A brief review of the positions taken throughout this term that began in 2023 is necessary.
In a list that should not be considered exhaustive, Lula: 1) Reactivated Brazil's participation in various international organizations to which Bolsonaro had given little attention; 2) Attempted a rapprochement with China at the start of his government and increased trade ties after US tariffs, but stalled and refused participation in the Belt & Road Initiative; 3) Reactivated the Amazon Summit, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization, and held COP30 in the Amazon, demonstrating a focus on the Green Agenda and on the internationalization (mediated by Western NGOs) of the Amazon region; 4) Condemned the Russian special military operation in Ukraine, but opposed Western sanctions on Russia, attributing responsibility for the conflict to both NATO and Russia, in addition to refusing to send weapons and ammunition to the Ukrainians, while on the other hand defending the withdrawal of Russian troops and the return of all territories liberated/integrated into Ukraine (including Crimea); 5) Condemned the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation of October 7, 2023 as a terrorist attack, also criticizing the Israeli reaction as disproportionate and, later, as genocide, generating tensions with the Netanyahu government; 6) Pressed for "free elections" in Venezuela, refused to recognize Maduro's reelection, vetoed Venezuela's entry into BRICS; 7) Chaired BRICS in 2025, without much progress; 8) Free trade agreement with the European Union; 8) Condemned Nicaragua and Daniel Ortega at the UN and in human rights organizations; 9) Criticized the intensification of embargoes against Cuba and continued humanitarian aid to the country; 10) Took the case of Trump's tariffs to the WTO; 11) Expanded defense partnerships with Sweden, Italy, Turkey, and other NATO countries for the production of military equipment (aircraft, vehicles, etc.); 12) Allied with Canada and the European Union in the "Partners for Multilateralism" initiative, which aims to strengthen the UN against threats of revision of the old international order; 13) Publicly formed a common front with the US (when it was governed by Joe Biden) against the threat of "autocracies" and the "international far right."
From these positions taken by the Lula government between 2023 and 2026, we can deduce some very specific patterns and trends:
1) Defense of strengthening the UN, multilateral organizations, and the post-Cold War "rules-based world order," against US unilateralism and the multipolarist revisionism defended by counter-hegemonic powers; 2) Inclination toward the European Union, as long as Trumpist dominance lasts in the US; 3) Maximum diversification of trade relations; 3) Thematic focus on the Green Agenda, on the defense of liberal democracy, and on the defense of "human rights."
If we ignore Lula's speeches and focus exclusively on a deconstruction of the concrete positions and effective actions of Brazil during its current government, we acquire an image that is quite different from the one seen by a large part of foreign analysts, who often have a more "Chavista" image of Lula.
In theory, there is no reason for Brazil's international posture to change in the coming years. It tends to remain approximately the same, with the trends already indicated.
The only disruptive factor in the predictability of the Brazilian government is the US.
For inevitable geographic reasons and due to a decrease in psychosocial autonomy, Brazilian policy is extremely dependent on the political shifts that occur from time to time in the US.
In this sense, therefore, given the current Brazilian political crisis, if the US government stops recognizing the electoral result and moves toward direct attempts to destabilize Brazil through sanctions, the recognition of a "government in exile," etc., this could indeed force Brazil into a more counter-hegemonic posture.
Nevertheless, if Trump ignores the Bolsonarist lobby and seeks some modus vivendi with Lula, there is a strong tendency toward maintaining those trends we have already indicated.
And finally, if the Democrats return to the White House after the 2028 elections, then the Brazilian government will make a more pro-US turn, seeking rapprochement with Washington, as had been happening when Joe Biden was president of the US.