Alastair Crooke
The short answer is 'no', Alastair Crooke writes.
The short answer is 'no'. Trump was confabulating when he said that he was already in negotiations with 'important' Iranians.
There is a back history to the U.S.' 'negotiations narrative'. In earlier rounds of 'negotiations' centred on the Ukraine conflict, Trump regularly would suggest that political negotiations with Russia were ongoing, when in practice, Witkoff and Kushner were simply engaging in a series of endless talks with the Europeans about establishing a ceasefire and the putative European-led 'peacekeeping' role that the Europeans were demanding. In fact, these 'peace plans' were never shared, or shown to Russia's Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov.
A prolonged 'ceasefire' then was seen by the White House as the bypass strategy to trying to resolve the entrenched security architecture issues between NATO and Russia's sphere of security interests. Russia simply said 'no' to Trump's attempt to 'kick the security architecture can down the road'.
The same pattern of dissimulation was evident in the Gaza ceasefire talks: Ceasefires were proposed without specifying any details of what might follow in Phase Two of the ceasefire.
Last weekend, Witkoff and Kushner drew up their wish-list for yet another ceasefire - in Iran this time - with more 'cans' to be kicked along for later discussion. Same story. Same confabulation. A fifteen-point peace plan, drawn up by Witkoff and Kushner, was put to the client mediators - with its demands being hailed by Trump as "very good, and productive conversations regarding a complete and total resolution of hostilities" - and with Iran "desperately wanting a deal".
Iran, to Trump's chagrin, said 'no way' to the proposal: Ebrahim Zolfaghari, spokesperson for the Iranian military said, "Our first and last word has been the same from day one, and it will stay that way".
Iran has no interest in a compromise at this point as it has not achieved its (audacious) strategic ambition to overturn the long-standing U.S.-Israeli military and financial dominance of the Gulf region - and to remake it as a wide Iranian economic and military sphere of interest ('hemisphere', if you will).
In any event, Iran possesses the escalatory dominance in this conflict - through dint of decades-long preparation and planning. Iran has already demonstrated that it controls the twenty percent of global oil exported via the Hormuz Strait. It has therefore the tools (regulation of passage of vessels through the waterway) to manage the volume of oil exported, and, as significant, if not more so, the ability to influence its globally sensitive pricing (once the sole prerequisite of the U.S.).
More than just having one major component of the global economy under its thumb (oil), Iran effectively has much of the world's supply lines and commodity production under its thumb too: Helium; fertiliser; food and Sulphuric acid all are to one extent or another dependent on Hormuz, and its closure for more than three weeks would create crippling shortages that would be unlikely quickly to disappear.
Manipulation of the oil economic lever, plus Iran's insistence that vessels transiting the Straits both pay a fat fee and prove that their cargoes were purchased in Yuan, strikes also at the heart of Trump's political vulnerability - the U.S. economy, in the run up to the U.S. Midterm Elections.
One regional report cautions:
"Iran has a permanent plan for checkpoints in the Strait of Hormuz to offset losses. Should the attacks that Trump threatens materialize, Iran will choke the Strait of Hormuz, close the Red Sea routes, and the Yemeni front will act to seal Bab al-Mandeb. Iran is also prepared to reclaim Bahraini ports if the situation demands".
Trump once said that to lose dollar hegemony would be worse for America than losing a major war. Yet this is precisely what is in play in this 'game of chicken' which Trump started with Iran, but where he is now at a loss for how to exit, without damaging humiliation.
"Washington is in shock", Anna Barsky, chief political correspondent of (Hebrew language) Ma'ariv wrote in response to the Wall Street Journal outlining the list of counter demands that Iranian representatives have conveyed through mediators to the Trump team as Iran's pre-conditions to a settlement:
"White House officials described the demands as"a wish list un-connected to reality on the ground"".
With these economic cards already in Iran's hands, and with its readiness to match Israeli-U.S. bombardment escalation with its own retaliatory missile strikes on Gulf States' infrastructure, pari passu, it seems inherently unlikely that Trump will get any plausible exit from war - not least because 'Israel has a vote' in this matter, and Israel has now shifted from the hope of 'regime change' to insistence that the U.S. seize Kharg Island in the Hormuz.
Israel has acknowledged that its hoped-for regime change objective in Iran has failed, write leading Israeli commentators ( Ronen Bergman and Anna Barsky). So it is recalibrating its objectives - "Jerusalem [now] believes that the path to [an Israeli] victory runs through control of Kharg Island", writes Barsky.
"According to this line of thought, if the [U.S.-Israeli] campaign does not lead to the overthrow of the regime, a much more tangible move is required - one that will deprive Iran of both the ability to export oil on a normal scale and its ability effectively to threaten maritime traffic".
"This discussion leads to another conclusion: Without a physical presence at a key point, it is very difficult to prevent Iran from repeatedly returning to the same pattern... To change reality, actual control must be created. In this context, Kharg is presented as a target whose takeover could simultaneously deprive Iran of both strategic income and room for action"
But, notes Barsky, "It is estimated however, that the real difficulty is not on the operational side... It is in Washington":
"The question is not whether the U.S. can reach Kharg and take control of the island. The question is whether Trump is willing to maintain a force there for a long time, with the possibility of casualties among American forces".
Ex-CIA officer, Larry Johnson, writes that U.S. intervention in Hormuz likely is imminent and would be disastrous (i.e. lead to many American casualties):
"[U]nless Donald Trump reconsiders, we are likely to see the U.S. attempt to seize both Kharg and Qeshm islands. If you read my previous piece ( here), it appears that Trump will use both Delta Force and Seal Team 6, along with two Ranger battalions and the 82nd Airborne's 1st Brigade Combat Team, to seize the islands".
"The 31st Military Expeditionary Unit, MEU, will be in place in the Arabian Sea, on Friday... I [have now] learned that... Trump cancelled his appearance at CPAC this weekend and that he will not attend a fundraiser at Mar-a-Lago on Friday night".
"Looks like [Trump] will be otherwise occupied starting Friday", Larry Johnson speculates.
"But then what ? Those troops will be sitting targets and will face a serious risk of being cut off from resupply. If Iran releases a tsunami of mines, then the only option will be aerial resupply, which likely means those aircraft will face withering fire from Iranian shore batteries and air defence systems. Instead of opening the Strait of Hormuz, the anticipated U.S. military action will make it virtually impossible for any ship to enter or exit the Persian Gulf. The complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz will further worsen the economic damage to the world economy".
Iranian Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian reacted to the threat of American 'boots on the ground' in Hormuz:
"For years, we've been awaiting [an American invasion]. Now, we have just one message for the American soldiers: Come closer".
Come into my parlour, said the spider to the fly.